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court found that the state statutes regarding public participation in
enforcement actions were inadequate to warrant precluding a citizen
suit. The court reasoned that the ex post facto nature of the Alabama
notice provisions were not comparable because the analogous CWA
provisions provided notice to the public and the ability to present
evidence in hearings prior to issuance of the final order. The court of
appeals additionally held that fifteen days was an unreasonable time
for the public to make proper requests for a hearing to appeal the
decision on the final order. Consequently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
summary judgment and held that the public participation and notice
sections of the statute were not comparable with the analogous CWA
provisions. Thus, McAbee's citizen suit could proceed as a matter of
law.
Holly Shook

FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. C1. 570 (Fed. C1. 2002) (holding that
continual beneficial use of water for ranching established vested water
rights and that because plaintiff possessed rights-of-way to ditches
under the 1866 Ditch Rights-of-Way Act, he need not prove that the
ditches remained in the same beds).
E. Wayne Hage and the Estate of Jean N. Hage ("Hage") sued the
United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims seeking
damages for unconstitutional takings of: (1) vested water rights in the
Southern Monitor Valley; (2) vested water rights in the Ralston and
McKinney allotments; (3) ditch rights-of-way; (4) grazing permits; and
(5) a surface estate. The United States moved to dismiss. The court
deferred claims regarding takings and compensation, and focused
solely on whether Hage demonstrated a property interest, and the
scope of that interest. The court found that Hage possessed vested
water rights in both the Southern Monitor Valley and the Ralston and
McKinney allotments and rights-of-way to three ditches and therefore
denied the United States' motion to dismiss with regard to these
claims. The court found that Hage possessed no rights to grazing
permits or a surface estate and granted the motion to dismiss with
regard to these claims.
Hage owned the Pine Creek Ranch in Nevada, and filed suit
alleging takings in 1991 because the government revoked his grazing
permits; diverted the water on his grazing allotments; blocked access to
ditches; allowed other species to use the water reserved for his cattle;
impounded his cattle; deprived Hage of the economic use of the
ranch; and owed Hage for improvements made to the rangeland. In
1996, the court partially granted the United States' motion for
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summary judgment, but held that Hage retained the opportunity to
determine whether his claimed rights existed. Hage amended his
complaint to add a claim for a surface estate, which the court refused
to rule on until after conducting an evidentiary hearing. In 1998, the
court held a two-week trial and issued a preliminary opinion for
purposes of encouraging a settlement. The holding in this case
rescinded all of the preliminary opinion not explicitly reaffirmed in
this opinion.
The court first addressed jurisdiction, challenged by the state of
Nevada by a Writ Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition.
Nevada argued that the court should halt this proceeding because the
state began its adjudication process in September 1998, immediately
prior to the evidentiary hearing for the federal takings proceeding.
Nevada claimed that the in rem nature of the takings suit meant that
the court should halt its consideration of the rights issues and give
Nevada jurisdiction because the adjudication initiated in rem
proceedings at the state level first. The court found it possessed
jurisdiction because Hage sought monetary compensation for takings
by the government so the proceeding was not in rem and the court
could determine validity of claims, even while the state adjudication of
the basins took place.
Next, the court addressed Hage's claims for vested water rights.
The court found that possession of a vested right requires acquisition
of a right from the government, diversion for a beneficial use, and
continuous use.
The court held that Hage proved continued
beneficial use of a water right appropriated by predecessors by the
preponderance of evidence presented, including testimony by the
state engineer, to nine creeks, ditches and springs in the Southern
Monitor Valley.
The court also held that Hage demonstrated continuous and
beneficial use of water rights appropriated by predecessors to several
bodies of water in the Ralston and McKinney allotments. In the
Ralston allotment, the court found that Hage possessed water rights to
eighteen channels, ditches and wells. In the McKinney allotment, the
court found Hage possessed vested water rights to four springs.
Hage also claimed to possess a property interest to several ditches
covered by the 1866 Ditch Rights-of-Way Act ("Act"). The United
States argued that only one of the ditches fell under the Act because
the others no longer followed their original ditch beds. The court
decided requiring Hage to prove that the ditches ran in the same beds
placed an unreasonable burden on him because flooding and other
natural forces changed the course of beds. Therefore, the court found
that Hage demonstrated rights-of-way to ten ditches under the Act.
The court found Hage failed to meet the necessary burden of proof
for six right-of-way claims to other pipelines and ditches.
The court agreed with the United States argument that a vested
right-of-way is potentially subject to reasonable regulation. However,
the court found that such regulation could not deny access to water
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rights without allowing Hage to divert water to another beneficial use,
therefore the court granted Hage the right to divert the water.
The court addressed the United States' argument that a United
States Forest Service ("USFS") manual determined the scope of rightof-way easements, and that a right-of-way of fifty feet exceeded the
necessary amount for reasonable maintenance. The court ruled that
the USFS manual lacked the force of law and constituted only
persuasive authority. In addition, the court found that the USFS
lacked the authority to adjudicate rights-of-way under the Act, since
that role was reserved for the judiciary. Finally, the court found that
legislative intent, and common sense, supported a fifty-foot right-ofway to allow access to the ditches for maintenance.
The court next addressed Hage's claim regarding the grazing
permit. The court held that the Taylor Grazing Act and several cases
hold that permits are only a license to use the land for grazing, not an
absolute right, and that the Secretary of the Interior may cancel or
modify permits. Therefore, Hage possessed no property interest in the
grazing permit, and no compensable right existed.
Finally, the court addressed Hage's claim to a 752,000-acre surface
estate for grazing originating under the Ordinance of May 20, 1785;
Kearney's Code and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo; the Act of 1866;
the Desert Lands Act of 1877 and the subsequent Acts of 1888 and
1890; the Creative Act of 1891; the Forest Service Organic
Administration Act; the Livestock Reservoir Siting Act; the Stock
Raising Homestead Act; the Taylor Grazing Act; and Nevada's Three
Mile Grazing Rule. The court found that legislative intent behind
these statutes did not support granting Hage a large surface estate
under these acts, and that at most Hage could go on the land to access
water in which he owned a vested right.
JaredEllis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
City of Olmstead Falls v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (holding the sovereign immunity
waiver in the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision does not apply if
the citizen fails to provide notice prior to filing suit; the sovereign
immunity waiver in the federal facilities pollution control provision
does not apply when there is no allegation of a federal facility
engaging in polluting; the Administrative Procedure Act's sovereign
immunity waiver does not apply to discretionary actions; and the
mandamus statute does not apply to allegations of failure to perform
discretionary duties).

